This paper revisits the empirical relationship between oil and democracy. Existing studies establish a negative cross-country correlation between oil and democracy in a Pooled OLS framework. This insight has recently been challenged by claiming that it suffers from omitted variables, and that including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between oil and democracy. This paper argues that because of the high persistence of democracy and oil, the findings of no effect of oil on democracy suffers from weak instrument problems and is not informative. Indeed, this paper shows that levels of oil systematically predict both levels and changes in democracy in a sample of up to 156 countries between 1972 and 2002.
Introduction
Quantitative cross-national research on the determinants of democracy finds that education as well as economic development is associated positively with the extent to which the political system manifests properties of democracy (see e.g. Barro, 1999) .
Two of the most robust determinants of democracy -per capita GDP and schoolingfound by Barro (1999) , have recently been put into doubt. Acemoglu et al. (2008) find little support for the hypothesis that income causes democracy when country fixed effects are included, and Acemoglu et al. (2005) find no evidence indicating that a given country (with its other characteristics held constant) is more likely to become more democratic as its population becomes more educated.
1 Their argument is that the earlier literature looks at the cross-sectional correlation between income and democracy and education and democracy rather than the within variation. Hence existing inference may be driven by omitted factors. It is widely thought that resource wealth, especially oil, is a curse for democracy (Ross, 2001; Jensen & Wantechekon, 2004; Tsui, 2009 ).
Existing literature looks mainly at the cross-sectional correlation between resource income and democracy rather than at the within variation. Hence existing inference may be potentially driven by omitted factors influencing both the oil abundance measure and democracy in the long run.
If insights regarding income level and education have been found to change when country fixed effects are included, it is necessary to put the insights regarding oil and democracy to a similar test. A causal link between oil income and democracy suggests that we should also see a relationship between changes in oil income and changes in democracy. In other words, we should ask whether a given country (with its other characteristics held constant) is more likely to become less democratic as it becomes richer in oil. I show that the answer to this question is yes. I show that the cross-sectional relationship between oil and democracy persist when country and time effects are included using a dynamic panel model.
There are several reasons why the existing literature on oil and democracy may be problematic. Oil is of obvious reasons not measured in absolute quantity in cross-country regressions. What is of relevance is the value of the oil sector compared to the rest of the economy -the relative importance of oil. Therefore, in cross-country regressions (whether we rely on the stock or the flow of oil), when oil is measured as a share of GDP or as a share of export it will be subject to the same concerns as those addressed by Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) . Over the past decade, a distinguished body of empirical literature has emerged in support of arguments that institutional form and quality are deeply embedded in history and geography (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001 , 2002 Easterly & Levine 2002 ). Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001 , 2002 have documented that mortality rates faced by Europeans and population density at the time of colonization were major determinants of European colonization strategy, and subsequent institutional and economic development paths. Thus, in countries with extractive institutions, the only profitable economic activity will be resource extraction. If there is a natural resource to be exploited, it will be, even though other sectors suffer from a lack of secure property rights and bad infrastructure. Therefore, omitted factors that determine the quality of institutions could also determine the level of oil dependency. Because of initial conditions, countries are both heavily dependent on their resource sector and non democratic. If this is so, oil does not hinder democracy, but the two are correlated due to omitted variables and a better approach is to control for country fixed effects.
Understanding the determinants of democracy is important in itself. But understanding how democracy, and hence the determinants of democracy, relates to peace is perhaps even more important. Considerable research has examined how regime type or the level of democracy relates to domestic conflict and peace. Much of it focuses on the result that semidemocratic regimes exhibit a higher propensity for civil conflict than either autocracies or democracies. Hegre et al. (2001) (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Lujala, 2010) , others claim that higher dependence on primary commodity exports for national income creates weaker state institutions (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) , and that this might be the channel to conflict. 2 Therefore, understanding the oil democracy relationship might also shed light on the relationship between natural resources and conflict.
Perhaps the most celebrated explanation for why oil hinders democracy is the rentier effect. The mechanisms underlying the claim that renterism harms democracy are of three main sorts (for a more extensive discussion, see Ross, 2001 ). The first concerns how the state collects revenue. When government derive sufficient revenues from the sale of oil, they are likely to tax their population less, and the public in turn will be less likely to demand accountability from and representation in their government. The second mechanism concerns how the state spends revenues. Oil wealth may lead to greater spending on patronage, which in turn dampens latent pressure for democratization. A third mechanism focuses on society. When oil revenues provide the government with enough money, the government will use its wealth to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent of the state and hence that may demand political rights.
There are several models in the economic literature linking resource income to democracy and institutional quality. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) Similarly, Horiuchi & Wagle (2008) argue that the negative association between oil abundance and democracy is not robust to the inclusion of historically relevant variables. Once they incorporate in the models of Ross (2001) , each country's historical characteristics using statistical 'fixed-effects', the impact of oil-dependence on regime type disappears. They note, however, that there are some econometric issues involved in adopting this estimation, but conclude that to deal with these issues while properly accounting for modelling dynamic models with fixed-effects is beyond the scope of their paper.
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This paper advocates that the negative relationship between oil and democracy persist when country fixed effects are included. In this paper I rely on the system GMM estimator, which has been proved to perform better than the first-difference estimator in
Monte Carlo simulations when variables are highly persistent (see Blundell & Bond, 1998) . Although fixed effect and first difference GMM estimators exploit the within country variation in the data, they might not be appropriate when variables are highly persistent over time, as is the case of democracy and oil income. Therefore, an econometric technique that exploits the bulk of the variation in the data would be preferable in order to improve the precision of the estimated coefficient. By adding the original equation in levels to a system of equations that also include equations in first 3 I argue that this approach suffers from weak instrument problems and I explain this in detail in the section entitled Fixed Effects. 4 First, if the causal variable -resource rent -does not have sufficient variation within each country and show no significant effect on the dependent variable, one cannot confidently establish whether resource abundance has an effect on regime type or whether the results are owing to insufficient within-country variation. Second, the lagged dependent variable in a fixed-effect model will bias the estimates.
differences, the system GMM estimator is particularly useful in this context since, in addition to controlling for country-specific effects, it preserves the cross-country dimension of the data that is lost when only the first differenced equation is estimated The checklist includes three questions on the electoral process, four questions on the extent of political pluralism, and participation and three questions on the functioning of government. For details see Freedom House (2006) . 6 As a check on the main measure of democracy, I also used the composite Polity Index. See Marshall and Jaggers (2008) . To facilitate comparison with the Freedom House score, I also normalized the Polity Index to lie between zero and one. The summary statistics, and the main results using the Polity index, is presented in the Appendix, Table A .II -A.V.
extraction is zero or the data is actually missing. Therefore, missing values are replaced with zero if there is no onshore or offshore oil production for that country according to the PETRODATA dataset (see Lujala et al., 2007 
Results with Pooled Cross Sections
I first replicate some of the basic results in the literature using a pooled cross-sectional approach. Table I reports estimates of the following model:
where is the democracy score of country i in period t. The lagged value of this variable on the right hand side is included to capture persistence in democracy and also potentially mean-reverting dynamics, i.e., the tendency of the democracy score to return to some equilibrium value for the country (Acemoglu et al., 2008) . The main variable of interest is , the lagged value of oil income in GDP. The parameter therefore measures whether oil has an effect on democracy. All other potential covariates are included in the vector / . denotes a full set of time effects, which capture common shocks to democracy for all countries, and is an error term, capturing all other omitted factors.
Note that Equation (1) does not include any country fixed effects. Therefore, the only sources of long-run differences in democracy across countries are the right hand side variables. In other words, the only cross-country differences in the long-run democracy score will be due to differences in oil or other covariates across countries.
The estimates of the relationship between democracy and oil from Equation (1) will reveal the cross-sectional relationship between these two variables (i.e., they will capture the fact that oil rich counties are less democratic). All columns in Table I include a full set of time effects, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. Column 2 add log of real GDP per capita to the basic specification. The oil variable is now larger and still highly significant. Log of GDP per capita is significant, and shows a positive association between income and democracy. Columns 3 and 4 add average years of schooling and log population. The coefficients of the oil variable are about the same and still statistically significant at 1%. Educational attainments is significant in Column 4, and indicate a positive association between education and democracy. Log population is insignificant when average years of schooling is included. The oil variable remains in the same range and highly significant when additional controls are included (Column 5). The Muslim percentage of the country's population is negatively related to democracy, 9 the absolute value of latitude (distance from the equator), a popular proxy for geographic effects on economic development, is marginally significant (at 10%) and the fraction of a country's border that is coastal is associated with better democracy. The results are similar if the Polity Index is used instead of the Freedom House index. 10 The magnitude of the oil variable, when the full sets of covariates are included, is within the same range as in Ross (2001) . 11 Overall, the regressions in Table I confirm the main finding of the existing literature of a negative association between oil and democracy.
__________________________

Results with Fixed Effects
I now revisit the basic results of the last section in the panel set up with fixed effects. In terms of Equation (1), the presence of fixed effects implies that the error term can be represented as , which differs from the specification in (1) because it includes a full set of country dummies. These country dummies capture any timeinvariant country characteristic that affect the equilibrium democracy level.
Consequently, even if two countries have the same values of the covariates, they can have different long-run equilibrium values of democracy.
If the error term takes the form , with the correlated with or / , then pooled OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. Underlying political and social forces shaping both equilibrium political institutions and the potential for export diversity and economic development will be controlled for in the fixed effects specification. There should however, be no presumption that fixed effects regressions will necessarily estimate the causal effect of oil on democracy. In the presence of factors that affect the joint evolution of democracy and oil abundance, there is no reason to expect that the fixed effects estimates will be consistent. Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions, the inclusion of fixed effects will lead to estimates that are less biased than the pooled OLS estimates. In addition, there is also an econometric problem involved in the estimation of the fixed effect specification. The regressor is mechanically correlated with for so the standard fixed effects estimation is not consistent.
The so called 'Difference' GMM estimator relies upon the following orthogonality conditions.
where represents the instruments set used in this GMM estimator. In this setting, it is well known that the higher the persistence of the series used as instruments, the lower is the correlation between levels and subsequent differences. 12 The characteristic of persistency in the explanatory variables may cause several biases in the first difference GMM estimator. This weak instrument argument can be seen by considering the following transformation of a simple AR(1) process ∆ 1 .
The higher the persistence , the lower ∆ . Democracy, oil income and education are highly persistent, therefore lagged levels are weak instruments and it is possible to gain precision in terms of point estimates bias by exploiting some additional moment restrictions. 13 The so-called 'System' GMM estimator stacks together the equation in first differences and the equation in levels in a system of equations and employs both lagged levels and differences as instruments (Bobba & Coviello, 2007) .
In order to consider the additional moments as valid instruments, the following additional linear moment conditions must be satisfied:
Equation (3) implies that changes in democracy are orthogonal to the country fixed effects. I test the validity of this assumption. I also control for a weak form of 12 Simulation results show that the Difference GMM may be subject to a large downward finite sample bias, particularly when T is small. See Blundell & Bond (1998 employ the one and two-step Difference GMM estimators. 16 As seen from Column 3 and 4 the oil variable is not statistically significant, and the education variable is negative. The negative coefficient of education on democracy, with this specification, has been found in related research (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2005; Bobba & Coviello, 2007) . Acemoglu et al. (2005) interpret the result that the positive association between education and democracy disappears once we control for country specific-effects as the cross-sectional relationship between education and democracy is driven by omitted factors influencing both education and democracy rather than a causal relationship.
Bobba & Coviello (2007) and Castello-Climent (2008) disagree in this interpretation
and argue that due to the high persistence in democracy and education, the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2005) are subject to weak instruments problems. In order to address these weak instrument problems they argue in favour of using an alternative estimator that reduces the potential biases and imprecision associated with the first difference estimator. They show that education systematically predict both levels and changes in democracy by considering a different identification assumption by using additional and more informative moment conditions to instrument the regressors. In light of this discussion I conclude that the estimators in Column 3 and 4 are biased, and the consequent finding that oil has no effect on democracy and that education has a negative effect may not be instructive.
14 The equivalent of Table II using the Polity Index is is presented in the Appendix, Table A.IV. 15 See Bond (2002) for details on the bias of the two bounds. 16 The two-step GMM is implemented using the Windmeijer (2005) correction using xtabond2.
Columns 5 and 6 report the System GMM estimates, one and two-step, respectively, and the results are striking: lagged oil share now has a negative and significant effect on democracy at the one % significant level, and lagged level of education now has a positive and significant effect. The coefficient of the oil variable in the System GMM specifications is similar to the Pooled OLS specification. In fact, when I control for country and time specific effects and take into account the crosscountry variation in the data the results are akin to those obtained by Ross (2001) . A coefficient of -0.003 as in Column (5) The reliability of the results depends on the validity of the instruments. I report tests at the bottom of the table. The p-value of the AR(2) test gives the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation. The Hansen test validates the adequacy of the instruments, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments indicate that the specification is correct. The Diff Hansen test evaluates the validity of the additional orthogonality condition in the System GMM. As displayed at the bottom of Table II , the values of the tests suggest that the instruments are valid.
Robustness of the Results
The evidence found in the previous section reveals one main finding. It shows that even when controlling for fixed omitted variables, more oil is related to less democracy. In this section I study the robustness of this result. In Table III I control for some additional potential determinants of democracy that have been suggested by the existing literature. The additional controls include the log of per capita income; a 17 The long-run effect is calculated as (coefficient/1-α)*100*change. 18 The results with three and seven year intervals are is presented in the Appendix, Table A .V measure of the country size such as the level of population (in logs) and a measure of openness such as the sum of import and export in GDP.
_________________________ Table III in here _______________________
The results suggest that controlling for these potential determinants of democracy does not change the main finding of the paper. In both columns, the coefficient of the oil share remains negative and statistically significant. Log of per capita income is insignificant and hence support the results found in Acemoglu et al. (2008) , who argue that controlling for factors that simultaneously affect income and democracy (country fixed-effects) removes the statistical association between income per capita and democracy.
In the last table I check the robustness of the results to alternative measures of oil abundance -oil income per capita (in thousand 2005 US$), log of oil share and log of oil income per capita. In the previous tables, there is the concern that changes in the oil variable are due to the change in the denominator, and not actually in oil income. more oil is associated with less democracy. One additional concern might be that the results are driven by a small number of influential outliers. As a first step towards resolving this concern, I transform the oil variables to logs. Column (2) includes the log of oil value per capita, and Column (3) includes log of oil share. Again the results indicate that more oil is associated with less democracy.
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_________________________ Table IV in here _________________________ Finally, as an additional control for outliers, I re-estimate the regression in Column 5 of Table II by removing one country at a time. In all regressions the oil coefficient is negative and within the same range as in Column 5 of Table II and it is always statistically significant.
Conclusion
Some of the empirical findings of the determinants of democracy have recently been challenged. Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that insights regarding income level and education change when country fixed effects are taken into account. These authors point out that previous empirical evidence could suffer from omitted variable bias. The present paper advocates that this is not the case for the relationship between oil and democracy. Although a fixed effects and first-difference GMM estimator show no statistically significant relationship between oil and democracy, I have argued that these estimators may not be appropriate in the estimation of a dynamic panel data model with persistent variables. Improvements in the econometric techniques to estimate a dynamic panel data model with persistent variables have been made by Arrelano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) .
When this more appropriate econometric technique is used, the results are in line with Ross (2001) , which states a negative association between oil and democracy. This result holds for alternative measures of democracy and alternative measures of oil abundance, it is robust when including additional covariates and when removing major oil producers. , 1972 -2002 , with data at 5-year intervals. Sys-1 GMM and Sys-2 GMM are the one (two) step system GMM estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Period dummies are included in all regressions. The values reported for the Hansen test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The Diff Hansen reports the p-value for the validity of the additional moment restrictions required by the Sys GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Index. Diff-1 GMM and Diff-2 GMM are the one (two) step difference GMM estimation. Sys-1 GMM and Sys-2 GMM are the one (two) step system GMM estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The values reported for the Hansen test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The Diff Hansen reports the p-value for the validity of the additional moment restrictions required by the Sys GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Five year intervals, 1970-2000. 
